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Toxic Assets: Untangling the Web
Margarita S. Brose* & Bill Nichols
I. INTRODUCTION
The world has not been moving quickly enough to untangle the web
of toxic assets that lie at the root of the recent global financial crisis, and
society may be missing its chance to learn from its mistakes. The most
important question regarding the collapse of the financial market system
does not address how much money one is going to lose in the current
financial crisis but rather what happened to cause the global predicament
in the first place. In other words, the current focus on valuation is
misplaced; the focus should instead be on the relationships that
contributed to the meltdown. Those relationships were based on the
expectations of purchasers and the ―guarantees‖ of sellers of the
underlying securities, often with minimal supervision or forethought.
Now is the time to identify who did what, when it happened, and where
the relationships led. This shift in analytical focus can help build a
detailed audit trail that shows what actually happened in the financial
markets during the past five years.
Most commentators agree that the collapse of the subprime mortgage
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market was a major cause of the current crisis. 1 Some of the same
technological developments in business practices that enabled the system
to spin out of control so quickly are also key components in building a
fact base to describe the cause of the collapse. For example, the assets
collateralizing asset-backed securities (ABSs)2 and other similar assets
that originated in the now-collapsed housing market make up the bulk of
so-called ―toxic assets‖ found in portfolios of troubled banks. 3 These
subprime mortgages, and the financial instruments created by them,
leave a money trail that can help identify their owners and the practices
that affect their markets.4
These trails are not easy to follow. Specialized experts are required
to untangle the web of relationships between those who created, sold,
and bought the securities, which are complex because many of the same
parties are often involved at multiple levels of the same underlying
securities. 5 However, through this process of untangling, one can
uncover a definite set of facts to reveal what actually happened. Also, it
becomes possible to initiate a discussion about the proper way to create a
central repository of transactional history to help federal regulators
manage risk in a way that is rooted in our financial system, rather than
continuing merely to hypothesize about the crisis.
After providing relevant background, this Article theorizes why the
global financial system collapsed and proposes courses of action to
further understand and prevent future problems. Using the knowledge
gained by investigating the paper trails, future problems can be prevented
by (1) documenting and demonstrating the types of financial engineering
and preventing market practices that produced securities with obscure
risk profiles and maturity mismatches; (2) encouraging companies to
strengthen their back offices to help assess risk and avoid transactions
that add more toxic assets to companies‘ portfolios; and (3) creating a
system between the back offices and regulatory authorities to track

1. See generally JAMES R. BARTH, ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND
CREDIT MARKETS, A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET MELTDOWN (2009).
2. For a definition of asset-backed securities, see DWIGHT ASSET MGMT. CO., FIXED
INCOME PRIMER: ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.dwight.com/pubs/dwightABS2005.pdf [hereinafter DWIGHT] (―Asset-backed securities
are bonds or notes collateralized by the cash flows from a specified pool of underlying assets. These
asset pools are comprised of receivables from any number of consumer asset types, including credit
cards, auto loans, and home equity loans, as well as other nonconsumer asset types such as
equipment leases and loans, utilities, aircraft leases, and royalties.‖).
3. Bryan R. Routledge & Stanley E. Zin, Model Uncertainty and Liquidity, 12 REV. ECON.
DYNAMICS 543, 543–44 (2009).
4. See BARTH, supra note 1, at 16.
5. See LAURIE S. G OODMAN, ET AL., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT DERIVATIVES 8 (2008).
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transactional history that will help federal regulators foresee and manage
possible risks rooted in our financial system and, thereby, help prevent
future problems.
II. A STARTING POINT: A BACKGROUND ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
In order to understand and analyze the current market system, one
must first make some preliminary observations about the contemporary
financial markets, their recent evolution, and areas of activity. First, the
increase in the number and complexity of tradable instruments,
especially those related to structured securities, undoubtedly contributed
to the market failure.6 The following developments made this expansion
of tradable instruments possible:
 Advances in financial techniques used to structure custom
instruments; 7
 Development of a legal framework to support the requisite
underwriting arrangements; 8
 Proliferation of hedge funds, many of which were set up
primarily to invest in structured securities from the mortgage
boom;9 and
 A drive for market growth and increased profits from the
largest global banking and financial institutions, leading to
wider availability of securitized transactions and other
relationships previously confined to a small inner circle of
global banks.10
Over the past five years, these developments were at the core of the
business activities that generated wild volume growth in various types of
securities, particularly Credit Default Swaps (CDSs).11 In addition to
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. BARTH, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 125–26. ―A credit default swap is a contract that provides insurance against the risk
of a default by particular company. The buyer of the insurance obtains the right to sell a particular
bond issued by the company for its par value when a credit event occurs. The bond is known as the
reference obligation and the total par value of the bond that can be sold is known as the swap's
notional principal. The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the seller until the end of the
life of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. A credit event usually requires a final accrual payment
by the buyer. The swap is then settled by either physical delivery or in cash. If the terms of the swap
require physical delivery, the swap buyer delivers the bonds to the seller in exchange for their par
value.‖ JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS , FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 637 (5th ed. 2002).
The ―standard‖ structure utilized in CDOs where the underlying assets consist of investment grade
bonds (agency and prime) is referred to as the ―Six Pack.‖ This refers to six logical tranches
grouped into three classes: Senior, Mezzanine, and Subordinate. In the case of the set of CDOs that
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sheer volume growth, massive webs of relationships formed across asset
classes and between participants who bought and sold securities based on
subprime mortgages. 12 These webs made it increasingly difficult to
follow the money, as the quantity and complexity of financial
relationships increased. 13 Such complexities and increases in volume
made it easier for a large number of high-risk transactions to go
unmonitored or even completely unnoticed.14
Second, the combination of the advanced securitization products
such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), 15 the nascent secondary
Over-The-Counter (OTC)16 market for CDSs, and myriad new hedge
funds created to take advantage of these and other facets of market
evolution formed a classic ―feedback loop.‖ 17 The core of the process
consists of a relatively small number of players, a finite amount of raw
material to package, and a limit to the speed at which players can
package that material for distribution. 18 The tightly coupled nature of
relationships between market players in the feedback loop (and their
corresponding obligations), exacerbated by problems in recordkeeping,
led directly to widespread fear that the house of cards was crashing. 19
This fear cascaded from one set of securitized products (ABSs and
CDOs) to the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) market in a
matter of days in 2008.20 The fear crushed the economy by freezing cash
flows because the banks at the center of everyday commerce had turned

utilize subprime ABS as underlying collateral, the structure used is generally referred to as XS/OC
(eXcess Spread/Over Capitalization), referring to the methods used to extract the premium
associated with higher risk.
12. See JONATHAN CHENG ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, DEMYSTIFYING THE CREDIT
CRUNCH: A PRIMER AND GLOSSARY 5 (2008).
13. Id. at 5–7.
14. Id.
15. ―A collateralized debt obligation is a way of packaging credit risk in much the same way
as a collateralized mortgage obligation is a way of packaging prepayment risk. This involves
creating four classes of securities, known as tranches, from a portfolio of corporate bonds or bank
loans. The creator of the CDO normally retains tranche 1 and sells the remaining tranches in the
market.8 A CDO provides a way of creating high-quality debt from average-quality (or even low
quality) debt.‖ HULL, supra note 11, at 646–47.
16. ―The over-the-counter market is a telephone- and computer-linked network of dealers,
who do not physically meet. Trades are done over the phone and are usually between two financial
institutions or between a financial institution and one of its corporate clients.‖ Id. at 2.
17. See BARTH, supra note 1, at 13; Tyler Durden, The Negative Convexity of CDS Trading
and
Why
CDOs
Chase
Markets,
SEEKING
ALPHA,
Feb.
19,
2009,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/121462-the-negative-convexity-of-cds-trading-and-why-cdos-chasemarkets.
18. See BARTH, supra note 1, at 5.
19. See CHENG, supra note 11, at 3.
20. Id. at 5.
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the lending business into a manufacturing and packaging game. 21
Third, the products that prompted the credit freeze were the so-called
―toxic assets‖ engendered by the subprime mortgage loan market. The
facts regarding the way toxic assets came to destroy the market are
undisputed:
 The ABS market for subprime mortgage-backed securities
grew from under 10% of all mortgages in 2000 to roughly
25% in 2007;22
 The significant drop in the quality of subprime mortgages
beginning in late 2005—the subprime mortgages written in
2006–07 are significantly more likely to default than earlier
vintages of loans;23
 The realization that significant numbers of new mortgages
(and the securitized assets built on them) would not perform
nearly as well as the models used to structure and value them
predicted caused a collective panic in the trading and
banking communities; 24
 Continual refinement of increasingly specialized asset
classes from prior larger groupings, done in order to create
specialized products, combined with a limited numbers of
players in each sub-sector, led to a cascading seizure that
started in long-term debt markets and moved rapidly into
short-term money markets, thereby crippling the economy. 25
In short, the relationships among market participants trading CDSs
and other products based on subprime securities served as the
transmission mechanism to spread toxins throughout the system.
Lastly, the widely held view that market participants would moderate
their own behavior in order to protect their individual corporate viability
obviated the need for an entity to oversee the overall system. With no
central authority to report to, those who wanted to raise concerns
regarding subprime securities market trading practices were unable to do
so.26 Adding to the complexity of the problem was the increasing
globalization of the financial services industry, accompanying decreases
in transparency, 27 and the corresponding tendency of firms to engage in

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See BARTH, supra note 1, at 11–15.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 23.
See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 316.
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regulatory arbitrage.28
III. THE PRODUCTS
Products in the financial market contributed to the building
complexity and lack of oversight preceding the market‘s deterioration,
and therefore are integral to a discussion on the way to prevent similar
financial problems in the future. Relevant trends include the evolution
and use of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default
swaps (CDSs).
A. Derivative Securities: Structured Products (CDOs) and Pure
Derivatives (CDSs)
Derivatives consist of two major categories: structured instruments
that represent pieces of underlying assets and the classic ―pure
derivatives,‖ including options, 29 forwards,30 futures,31 and swaps.32 The
evolution of the markets for structured debt products led to the
emergence of a market for pure derivatives based on the credit risk that
one of the parties in the deal may default on its payment terms, hence the
name ―Credit Default‖ market, often referred to as the ―Credit Risk‖
market. 33
Structured products were generally developed with one of two goals
in mind—either to raise capital (especially for corporations) or to free up
room on the balance sheets of lending firms. 34 The layers of relationships
and corresponding obligations (debts or potential debts) created a house
of cards tied together with an increasingly complex series of links
between the instruments and participants. This uncertainty was
compounded by a lack of investment in the back office, where the
physical processing of transactions takes place. 35 With the attitude that
―traders and deals make money, everyone else is just a parasite,‖
companies often made short-sighted investments by outsourcing staff and

28. See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5.
29. Options allow one to pay for the ability, though not the requirement, to buy or sell
something in the future at a price determined today. Id. at 6.
30. Forwards allow one to lock in a future price without having to pay for the privilege, but
one is committed to the deal—there is no option not to transact at the given date. Id. at 2.
31. A future is a form of standardized forward that trades on an exchange. Id. at 5.
32. A swap is an agreement to exchange cash flows in the future. HULL, supra note 11, at 1.
For more discussion of structured instruments and pure derivatives, see id. at 125.
33. Id. at 637.
34. See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5.
35. Id.
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by implementing production mechanisms that put no value on
experience. 36 The products and markets became more complex and
specialized, and the costs calculated by companies regarding the
resources required to manage and complete transactions focused only on
a small subset of actual value. ―If we don‘t know how to measure it, or
we haven‘t taken it into account in the past, then it doesn‘t exist‖ seemed
to be the mantra of companies at the time. 37 This attitude led to a general
obliviousness to the high-risk nature of instruments based on subprime
loans and a corresponding recklessness in trading such instruments.
Furthermore, the lack of authority regulating the risk assessment
capabilities of the back office has made it nearly impossible to track the
irresponsibility of companies pursuing such high-risk transactions.
1.

Collateralized debt obligations

Although there are a variety of ways to categorize CDOs, for
purposes of creating an audit trail there are three important questions to
focus on:
(1) Is the CDO ―funded‖ or ―unfunded‖? The distinction here is
a combination of the way the deal is constructed and whether
securities need to be issued or cash needs to be invested for
the CDO to be traded.38
(2) Is the CDO a ―synthetic‖ or ―hybrid‖ structure? A standard
CDO39 is where the tranches 40 represent actual underlying
ABS instruments.41 A synthetic CDO is where some or all of
the tranches consist of packages of CDSs that are designed
to emulate the cash flows that would result from the selected
underlying instruments instead of acquiring the ABS
instruments that actually do produce the cash flows (this
usually creates basis risk).42
(3) Is the CDO actively or passively managed? If the fund
manager is able to trade other products to maintain the asset
base of the CDO, then there may be several areas where
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. HULL, supra note 11, at 646.
39. See id.
40. A tranche is one of a number of related securities offered as part of the same transaction.
The word tranche is French for slice, section, series, or portion. In the financial sense of the word,
each bond is a different slice of the deal's risk. Transaction documentation usually defines the
tranches as different classes of notes. See DWIGHT, supra note 2, at 6.
41. HULL, supra note 11, at 646.
42. Id.
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certain risks are introduced that are hard to measure or even
to detect.43
Such complexities require extensive documentation in order to detect
possible risks and assess them properly. Without this documentation it
would be impossible for the financial institution to know if it were
making a deal likely to leave nothing but toxic assets in the portfolio. 44
Once the deal has proven financially detrimental to the parties involved,
it is increasingly difficult for federal regulators to determine where things
went wrong, or to allocate responsibility for the situation, unless
documentation is available to identify the original agreement.
2.

Credit default swaps

Credit default swaps are bilateral contracts entered into to insure
against the default of a particular company. 45 Originally created as a
method for banks to mitigate their risks on loans and bonds, 46 CDSs
have become the primary instrument used in the Credit Risk Markets. 47
They comprise roughly 95% of the currently estimated credit derivatives
transactions and have served as the primary disease vector to spread
interlocking risks globally. 48 Other products in these markets include
total return swaps and total asset swaps.

Diagram 1
43. Id.
44. See generally GOODMAN, supra note 5.
45. CHENG, supra note 12, at 5.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Antoine Bouveret, The Credit Default Swap (CDS) Market, 52 TRÉSOR-ECONOMICS
1, 2 (Feb. 2009).
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In a traditional CDS arrangement, it is entirely optional for either
party to have an ownership interest in the underlying reference entity.
(See Diagram 1, illustrating the relationships in a CDS.)49 This option is
a critical factor in the growth of the market and in some of the more
negative aspects of CDSs combined with other instruments, particluarly
CDOs. In options markets, writing (i.e., selling) a put option on a
security one does not own is referred to as a ―naked put.‖50 A firm
selling a CDS that does not own the reference obligation is essentially
writing a naked put. Also, it is important to note that the reference entity
has no voice in the transaction—neither the buyer nor the seller is
obligated to report to anyone else that they have entered into the swap
agreement. A useful analogy is car insurance—not only can one buy
insurance for his own car, but so can hundreds of other people. The
insurance company will collect premiums from everyone who buys a
policy, but if the original owner drives his car into a ditch, the insurance
company will have to pay everyone who has purchased insurance on that
individual‘s car.51
Reference entities and obligations are typically sovereign or
corporate debt or, starting in roughly 2002, tranches of structured
securities. 52 Default events are either ―hard‖ or ―soft,‖ depending on
whether the terms of the deal allow, for example, a missed payment to be
made up in future installments.53 The soft defaults and the customization
with which they were created are a significant factor in the
recordkeeping nightmare into which the CDS transactions have
evolved. 54
A key attribute of a CDS is the difficulty of getting out of it—there is
no standard way to ―tear up‖ a contract. The lack of a standardized
termination method led many parties to write another CDS with a third
party that would offset the risk of the original contract, thereby adding
another instance of counterparty risk. Additionally, the process of
―novation‖ (i.e., a somewhat controlled re-assignment of deals) created a
significant mess in the recordkeeping and lifecycle management
processes related to CDS deals.

49. Diagram created by Bill Nichols based on discussions with industry participants.
50. See generally HULL, supra note 11.
51. Interview with Jim Northey, FIX/LaSalle Technology Group.
52. See generally David Mengle, Credit Derivative: An Overview, 92 ECON. REV. 4 (2007).
53. See generally International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) Home Page,
http://www.isda.org. The ISDA documentation covers six types of Default Events.
54. Id.
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B. Subprime Synthetic/Hybrid CDOs—The Toxic Disease Vector
The intersection of the CDO and CDS markets was central in the
market meltdown. Synthetic and hybrid CDOs created using CDSs to
emulate subprime ABS tranches and cash flow in turn created multilayered relationships. Because multiple players in the CDS market had
offsetting positions, the chain of relationships was tightly coupled and
cascaded out to other parts of the market faster than participants could
track or measure.55 Poor documentation of the increasingly complex web
resulted in trades based on incorrectly calculated valuations of
instruments. When these instruments mature or a default is triggered,
there is a great difference between the money available and how much
was expected or even guaranteed due to the improper valuations used. 56
Without the documentation and a regulating authority to review it, there
is no recourse for those injured by the recklessness of financial
institutions that misrepresent what they trade and ultimately sell what
they do not own.
IV. THE SUPPLY CHAIN: FOLLOW THE MONEY
With a foundational understanding of the factors leading to the
current crisis, one can examine a specific set of CDOs—securities built
from subprime ABSs with underlying vintages of 2005, 2006, and 2007.
Analyzing the supply chain in both directions (from origination to
purchase), greatly helps one to understand exactly where the assets and
obligations lie in the marketplace.
A modern market economy is organized around moving money
either in the present (making payments and borrowing money for a very
short period of time) or in the future (borrowing money for longer
periods or investing in some form of asset). The payment mechanisms
and short-term lending functions form the essential basis for the
operations of all members of the larger economy and are here referred to
simply as ―banking.‖ The investments and insurance sub-sectors of the
financial services industry are more complex and differentiated. The
focus here is primarily on the sub-sector of the investment groups that
engage in capital market activities—the creation and trading of
securities. All gateways to the investments group go through some type
of banking layer. In the United States, this path consists of a finite
55. Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, Structured Finance: Complexity, Risk and the Use of
Ratings, BIS Q. REV. 67, 69–70 (June 2005).
56. Id.
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number of firms, an extremely simple group to identify. 57 As discussed
below, many participants play multiple roles. And that is only the
beginning.
A. The Processes and Players
The overall process of creating and selling new financial instruments
consists of two relatively discrete steps. The first step is loan origination
and underwriting. Loan origination is the process by which loans
originate. Underwriting is the process of bringing securities to market; an
initial public offering in the stock market is typically underwritten by
consortium of investment banks, known as a syndicate. 58 Specific
mechanisms vary across asset classes and by original source of funds. In
the case of subprime mortgages, the original securities were not designed
to be traded in the secondary markets and required further modification
into structured ABS pools (with their associated CDOs) to make them
tradable assets.59 The second step is structuring and packaging.
Structuring refers to the legal, financial, and operational business
processes required to acquire and create pooled securities. 60 Packaging
refers to the marketing, sales, distribution, and lifecycle management
pieces required to solicit buyers for new securities.61
Once securities have been sold to the initial investors, they become
available in secondary markets. In these secondary markets, ownership
of the actual securities can change and other market participants—not
necessarily owners of the new securities—can use derivative instruments
to make trades reflecting their view of the securities‘ value. 62 The
creation of these new financial instruments relative to subprime
mortgages for the secondary markets brings its own complexities into the
equation.
B. Special Purpose Vehicles
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) are the means by which subprime
asset-backed securities in their new securitized form are sold into the
57. Philip Arestis & Elias Karakitsos, Subprime Mortgage Market and Current Financial
Crisis, CAMBRIDGE CENTER FOR ECON. & PUB. POL‘Y 1, 7–9 (2009).
58. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(A)(11) (2009); see, e.g., United States Securities and
Exchange Commission, Form S-1, Registration Statement, Visa Inc. (Nov. 9, 2007).
59. Asset-Backed Securities, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8518; 34-509405 (Mar. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8518.htm [hereinafter SEC].
60. See generally Heavenrich & Company, Inc., http://www.heavenrich.com/structuring.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
61. Id.
62. See generally SEC, supra note 59.
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market. 63 SPVs are a core piece of the structured finance ecosystem. The
specific parties involved in SPVs are important links in the chain to
―Follow the Money.‖64 (See Diagram 2 for a generic view of
relationships and players involved in a typical deal.) 65

Diagram 2

One can follow the money trail with the originators of the loans used
63. The SPV has specific legal, accounting, governance, and operational processes, and there
are several different versions of these structures, due mainly to different rules for manufacturers
depending on their position in the supply chain and relationship to the core underlying instruments.
Here we‘ll use the term SPV generically to include all these variations.
64. Fender & Mitchell, supra note 55, at 67, 70.
65. Committee on the Global Financial System, The Role of Ratings in Structured Finance:
Issues and Implications, BIS Q. REV. 6 (Jan. 2005).
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to create asset-backed securities. For subprime mortgages, independent
loan brokers originated the loans and sold the mortgages, at closing, to
mortgage loan companies, such as Countrywide Financial.66
Countrywide (or similar loan companies) would then sell the loan to
banks, investment banks, or brokerage firms, like Citigroup, Inc. or
Merrill Lynch.67 The banks or firms then packaged pools of these loans
(typically with common characteristics such as interest rate or maturity)
into asset-backed securities. These asset-backed securities would in turn
be sold to institutional investors such as hedge funds, insurance
companies, pension funds and mutual funds. 68
C. Unraveling the Documentation
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires
registration of each pool of asset-backed securities. Typically banks or
firms use their own in-house counsel or hire outside attorneys to prepare
and file paperwork with the SEC. In addition, they often hire
independent accountants to review their books in accordance with SEC
requirements. 69 It appears, however, a significant amount of data was
unrecorded with respect to the asset-backed transactions, especially
because certain filings were optional. 70 Actual completeness and
accuracy of filings related to securitized structures varied widely. 71 Thus,
a systematic assessment of these records is essential in unraveling what
went wrong and developing a way to prevent such problems in the
future.
Simply stated, lack of supervision in the securities trading market
made an economic crisis both possible and probable. Society has been
warned previously that financial supervision should keep up with
financial innovation.72 In keeping with that spirit, before the crisis, a

66. Countrywide Financial was a former independent mortgage lender which has since been
incorporated into Bank of America. See Zac Bissonnette, Bank of America Ditches Countrywide
Name, BloggingStocks, 19 Feb. 2009, http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2009/02/19/bank-of-americaditches-countrywide-name/.
67. By 2006, nearly every major investment bank or bank had purchased a non-bank
specializing in subprime mortgage loans and set up a ―warehouse‖ program to accumulate loans for
repackaging, making their ties to the industry even closerand, of course, increasing the demand for
new loans.
68. Paul Muolo & Mathew Padilla, Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage
and Credit Crisis 221-222 (Wiley & Sons 2008).
69. See generally SEC, supra note 59.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform
in the Bubble Era, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53, 57–59 (2009).
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multiple-authority supervision regime was in place that involved both
state and federal regulation and multiple departments, including the
Federal Reserve Bank, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and the SEC. This regime may have reflected the spirit of checks and
balances, as then Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan
successfully argued ―the absence of the dual system could actually hurt
consumers and the economy.‖73 However, with economic globalization
and rapid advancement of financial institutions, this multiple-authority
supervision regime created regulatory gaps resulting in unsupervised
high-risk derivatives.74
The most obvious of these gaps is the non-conforming regulatory
criteria. For example, while regular reporting of distributions from
structured investment vehicles can be found in documents filed with the
SEC, it is difficult to find internal company documentation of settled
transactions in CDSs.75 Trades in CDSs were done by teams on the CDS
desks of the investment banks; however, trades which were transacted
over the phone or via text messages were rarely cleared or settled in a
timely fashion by the banks‘ back office operations.76 In 2005, the
Federal Reserve uncovered a three-month delay in over 70% of the CDS
transactions on the Street.77 Little investment in back office technology
and a lack of communication with the front offices hindered efficient
operations with regard to these securities. 78 As there are no specific
guidelines regarding responsibility for the regulation of CDSs or CDOs,
no one regulatory body claims responsibility for overseeing trading of
these high-risk derivatives.
In the chaotic and unregulated ABS/CDO/CDS market of 2005–
2007, it is now apparent that little effort was made to carefully evaluate
the risk of the investments made by those buying and selling these
products. This combination of gaps and irregularities contributed in a
myriad of ways to the meltdown of the credit markets.79 However,
another important issue is the lack of timely documentation and
73. BNA Banking Report, Mar. 7, 1994 (arguing that having no alternatives in financial
regulation can hurt financial consumers and the economy).
74. David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 709, 732 (2009).
75. See generally SEC, supra note 59.
76. Timothy F. Geithner, Remarks at the Bond Market Association‘s Annual Meeting in New
York
City
(Apr.
20,
2005),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches_archive/2005/gei050420.html.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See generally SEC, supra note 59.
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recordkeeping in this unregulated market, especially with respect to
CDSs.80 Trading new, evolving, and highly complex instruments with
undocumented (or unknown) lifecycle requirements coupled with a
chronic lack of investment in operations is hardly a novel recipe for
trouble.81 However, the historical tendency of the front office and senior
management to regard operations as a ―necessary evil‖ to be funded at
minimal levels does not, by itself, explain what happened. 82
D. The Toxic Assets Web
Unwinding the threads from subprime mortgages to the ABSs
containing these mortgages, the packaging of CDOs from the same
underlying subprime assets, and CDS transactions based on the subprime
securities (but not requiring the underlying asset) essentially reveals the
same players creating, selling, and buying securities. (See Diagram 3.) 83
In this process, the initial one dollar loan was magnified to five dollars or
even fifty dollars worth of financial derivatives. Each step lengthened the
financial chain, until finally, no one cared about the basic value of the
financial products, leading the market to solve the problem with the fruits
of short-term speculation. The creation of a CDO required the bundling
of existing ABSs and other assets into a single securitized loan with
differing tranches. 84 Bankers and lawyers created the security, traders
and sales people in investment banks sold pieces of the loan, and the
same parties who had purchased the original ABSs were often the same
hedge funds, insurance companies, and pension funds who purchased
these derivative securities.85 In the same way, CDS sales and trading
were typically done among the same cast of characters, with the traders
once again making money for their investment bank, hedge fund, or bank
with each trade. 86 The investment banks made money with every trade,
from the bottom of the structure to the top. 87

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Geithner, supra note 77.
Id.
Diagram conceived and created by Bill Nichols. See Muolo & Padilla, supra note 68, at

220.
84. Id. at 221.
85. Id. at 115, 221.
86. Id. at 115.
87. Id. at 220; Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell,
N.Y.T IMES,Nov.08,2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/business/09magic.html?_r=1&8dpc=&_r.

15

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 6

Diagram 3
E. The “Magic Happens Here”: The Way to Make Something Toxic
Smell Clean
When U.S. housing price appreciation began to slow in 2007, the
investment banks traded CDOs based on subprime ABSs that went from
reasonably risky but high yielding instruments (that one theoretically
could pass off to other investors) to toxic assets almost overnight. 88 This
change was due in significant part to a combination of poor modeling
assumptions (e.g., ―house prices never go down‖) and related inflated
credit ratings applied to structured ABS tranches when they were
wrapped inside the CDO envelope and augmented with various forms of
credit enhancement. 89 In a process that now looks to be a tragic
combination of magic and wishful thinking, some of these tranches
somehow ended up with AAA investment ratings and were marketed as
high quality investments, which dramatically broadened the base of
potential investors to include pension funds and asset managers. (See
Diagram 4.)90

88. GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 298.
89. Id. at 128–29.
90. Diagram created by Bill Nichols based on discussions with industry participants. See
SEC, supra note 59; GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 316; Mengle, supra note 52, at 8–9.
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Diagram 4

Looking back, in the wake of the creative ratings of the CDOs, a
more active public sector involvement should now be emphasized. Not
only should the short-term issues be fixed, but also a sounder financial
system must be established to serve our long-term goal of a stable
financial market.
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
In order to create a more sound financial system, a conceptual audit
trail of the toxic assets borne from the subprime mortgage market should
be established. Such an audit trail can be created by simply identifying
the inputs and their corresponding instruments in the assets. Although
difficult, it is a task that can be done. Given the evolution of
technological tools, much of the standard software used to manage global
data flows for business in financial recordkeeping could be used to
achieve this goal.
As discussed above, the core arena for the market meltdown was the
intersection of the markets for CDOs and related CDSs. Fewer than fifty
firms globally were at the nexus where SPVs were spun out of banks and
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used to create subprime ABS CDOs,91 which makes a central repository
of these transactions very manageable. Starting with known loans with
poor vintages (post-June 2005) and working out the (at times theoretical)
money and contract flows structurally through the securities markets
would be the starting point to reconstruct and find the errors in the
system. Once the data is collected from the various parties, regulators,
financial institutions, and investors should be better able to understand
the combination of factors that permitted the toxic asset ―house of cards‖
to be assembled. This will hopefully encourage financial institutions to
invest more heavily in their back office to avoid the prevalence of toxic
assets in their portfolio. A stronger back office would mean more
accurate valuation of securitized assets and a clearer paper trail. This
should make institutions more accountable to regulating authorities,
more responsible to their customers, and better overall shepherds to their
shareholders‘ investments.
Ideally, a policy would be implemented to augment the motivation to
continue the data collection in these products and to fill in the gaps
through which certain instruments have squeezed. In tandem with
institutional measures, the government‘s policy of providing
transparency in our financial markets 92 should make such a data
warehouse for financial instruments and market participants a critical
piece in rebuilding our financial infrastructure. While the costs of this
effort are not trivial, many times the amount of money required for this
task has been handed to market participants responsible for creating
much of the crisis, with little discernible result.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike with past systemic market breakdowns, the technology and
ability needed to analyze precisely what happened in the current market
meltdown exists today. In the process, one can gain the knowledge
needed to craft future regulatory and governance approaches that
consider the collective set of facts that led to the current credit crisis. On
October 23, 2008, former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan
Greenspan testified before the Committee of Government Oversight and
Reform, stating that he had made a ―mistake‖ in believing that banks,
operating in their own self-interest, would do what was necessary to
protect their shareholders and institutions.93 He called it ―a ‗flaw‘ in the
91. BARTH, supra note 1, at 29.
92. BARTH, supra note 1, at 37–38.
93. See Brian Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, Greenspan ―Shocked‖ that Free Markets
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free market theory.‖94 Creating a central repository of transactional
history and a government authority to both regulate it and guide financial
institutions to be more responsible (while allowing them to retain selfinterest as the motive) is necessary to fix that flaw. The ―what‖ and
―how‖ of the contents to be regulated will be uncovered as one learns
from the past market collapse and works through the flawed structures
and processes that created that collapse. However, time is of the essence.
Each day new transactions further obscure the record, lessening our
chances of stopping this market crisis from reoccurring.

are Flawed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-gspan.4.17206624.html.
94. Id.
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